Mauritius: Competition Commission exercises new market inquiry powers

The Mauritius Competition Commission (Commission) has formally launched its first market inquiry - into the private healthcare sector. This is a significant development in Mauritian competition law enforcement, as it represents the first use of the Commission’s expanded market inquiry powers.

Following publication of the Market Inquiries Guidelines (CC8) on 31 March 2026 (Guidelines), the Commission issued a Notice of Initiation on 24 April 2026 to commence the Private Healthcare Market Inquiry (Inquiry). The Inquiry signals increased regulatory scrutiny of sectors characterised by high consumer expenditure and complex commercial relationships.

Significance of the Inquiry

Private healthcare plays a central role in the Mauritian economy and in household spending. The Notice of Initiation reports that in 2023, private health expenditure totalled approximately MUR 19 billion, comprising 53% of total healthcare spending.

Of this, around MUR 16 billion (84%) was funded directly by households through out‑of‑pocket payments. Further, cost increases in the sector over recent years have outpaced general inflation. Against this backdrop, the Inquiry reflects a concern around affordability, transparency, and the effectiveness of competition in private healthcare markets.

Potential competition concerns

In the Notice of Initiation, the Executive Director states that there are reasonable grounds to suspect that certain features of the private healthcare market may be limiting effective competition and harming consumers. 

The principal areas of concern include:

• High market concentration: Preliminary assessments suggest that there are high levels of market concentration in both the ‘broad market for private healthcare services’ and the ‘medical insurance market’. While market concentration may not be an issue in and of itself, it can give rise to anti-competitive outcomes.

• Referral practices and financial incentives: The Commission is concerned that financial incentives within hospital‑doctor arrangements may encourage unnecessary tests or procedures, potentially leading to overtreatment and inflated healthcare costs.

• Preferred provider arrangements: Insurers’ preferred provider arrangements may limit patient choice and restrict smaller or independent healthcare providers’ access to insured patients, particularly in a concentrated insurance market.

• Lack of transparency: The absence of standardised and publicly available information on pricing and treatment outcomes may impair patients’ ability to make informed choices and may contribute to higher costs.

At this stage, the Commission has emphasised that no findings of anti‑competitive conduct have been made. Any conclusions will depend on the evidence gathered and assessed during the course of the Inquiry.

Scope of the Inquiry

The Inquiry will focus primarily on the provision of healthcare services by private hospitals, while also considering the commercial arrangements and interactions among private hospitals, medical practitioners, and insurers. 

In particular, the Commission will:

• Assess market structure, including barriers to entry and expansion, and the existence or potential exercise of market power or superior bargaining positions.

• Examine conduct and contractual arrangements across the healthcare value chain, including referral practices, preferred provider networks, and forms of vertical integration.

• Review the existing regulatory framework to identify gaps that may restrict competition or limit transparency.

• Develop recommendations aimed at strengthening competition and improving transparency outcomes for consumers.

Obligations on market participants

The Commission’s investigative powers during a market inquiry are equivalent to those exercised in formal investigations and therefore include the ability to compel attendance at interviews, require the production of documents, and request written statements.

The Commission has also issued a formal call for submissions. All interested parties, including healthcare providers, insurers, industry bodies, public authorities, consumer organisations, and other stakeholders, are invited to submit relevant information, views, or queries. Written submissions must be addressed to the Executive Director by 30 June 2026.

Given the breadth of information‑gathering powers available, market participants should consider early internal preparation to ensure compliance and consistent engagement with the Inquiry process. 

Inquiry process and indicative timeline

In accordance with the Guidelines, the Inquiry will follow a structured three-phase process. 

Phase 1 – Initiation, was completed on 24 April 2026, with the publication of the Notice of Initiation setting out the objectives, scope, and timeline of the Inquiry, together with the call for submissions. 

Phase 2 - Inquiry, scheduled for 24 April 2026 – 28 August 2026. Information gathering and analysis, including desk‑based research, data analysis, stakeholder submissions and interviews, surveys, and expert consultations. During this phase, the executive director may exercise its investigative powers and may also appoint external consultants. 

Phase 3 - Reporting. The executive director is expected to issue a Preliminary Report in March 2027 setting out provisional findings and recommendations. 

Stakeholder consultation will occur during April-May 2027, with interested parties having a minimum of 21 business days to submit written comments on the Preliminary Report, including feedback on the content of the report and reasons why provisional findings or recommendations should not be made final. The executive director may also convene workshops or roundtable discussions with stakeholders prior to issuing the Final Report. After considering submissions, the executive director will prepare a Final Report for submission to the Commission. 

The executive director will target publication of the adopted Final Report in October 2027. 

Conclusion

The launch of the Inquiry marks an important exercise of the Commission’s expanded regulatory toolkit and signals an increased focus on structural and behavioural features of markets, especially those that directly affect consumer welfare.

Given the scale of private healthcare expenditure and the persistent escalation in costs, the Inquiry has the potential to shape both competitive dynamics and policy outcomes across the sector.

In addition, although a market inquiry is not itself an enforcement proceeding, the information it uncovers may expose other restrictive business practices occurring in that market such as patterns of coordinated or abusive conduct, which could prompt separate enforcement proceedings by the Commission.

Market participants should consider proactive engagement with the process, carefully assess their commercial arrangements and practices, and prepare for the possibility of recommendations aimed at enhancing competition, transparency, and consumer outcomes in Mauritius’s private healthcare system.

The Commission has referred to South Africa’s Healthcare Market Inquiry in initiating its own investigation, and while each jurisdiction’s market dynamics will shape the course of its inquiry, the South African process may offer useful context for those assessing this development as it unfolds.

Richard Bhagwan-Bryce is a partner in the Cape Town office who advises in various aspects of competition law including merger and behavioural matters and has experience across a number of industries. He is trusted by clients to handle complex and challenging matters in a number of African jurisdictions. Chetan Ancharaz is an associate in the Moka office of Bowmans in Mauritius. Nazeera Mia is a Knowledge and Learning Lawyer at Bowmans and a member of the Competition practice in Cape Town. She has experience in competition law across the rest of Africa.